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AUTHORITY

AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980 ; AGO ltr 29 Apr 1980

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (27 Dec 67) FOR OT RD-670805

4 January 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 135th Military Intelligence Group, Period Ending 31 July 1967

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation by USACDC in accordance with paragraph 6f, AR 1-19 and by USCONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d, AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

A 2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Nickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 135TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP
APO San Francisco 96243

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AVGJ-XSEC

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

12 August 1967

TO: Commanding Officer
525th Military Intelligence Group
ATTN: AVGJ-HO
APO US Forces 96307

(U) The following Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 is submitted in accordance with the provisions of USARV Regulation 870-2, dated 19 July 1966:

SECTION I
Significant Organization Activities

(C) During the reporting period, 1 May 1967 - 31 July 1967, the 135th Military Intelligence Group continued to support J2 MACV and US Army Vietnam with counterintelligence support aimed at the detection, investigation, exploitation and neutralization of hostile and foreign intelligence activities within the Republic of Vietnam. Counterintelligence area coverage was maintained throughout the 44 provinces and Capital Special Zone during the entire quarter, with the organization engaged in operational activities for a total of 92 days. Personnel of the Group continued to advise and assist Military Security Service counterparts at all levels. Counterintelligence support to Headquarters MACV was maintained throughout the period. An expanded Technical Support Branch enabled this organization to provide better and more responsive technical services in the form of CI inspections and surveys, DAME and DASE analysis, photographic service, and audio/visual technical intelligence. In addition, the Group continued to provide security support to all major Army commands operating in the Republic of Vietnam, with special emphasis placed on the reporting and investigations of SAEDA cases; during the period, seven developed SAEDA cases were closed, 337 security interviews were conducted, 262 Personnel Security Investigations were closed, and 1995 Local Agency Checks were processed. The Missing/Captured Personnel Program continued monitoring developments concerning captured US and Free World military and civilian personnel.

(C) In connection with counterintelligence interests, this organization published and forwarded 2431 Information Reports and 2361 Agent

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10

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Reports, and completed 4450 separate file screenings. 5114 new personality and organizational cards were added to the Central Files and raised the approximate total of cards on file to 65,000. The Reproduction Section produced 270, 606 copied impressions from operational and administrative references. In addition, this organization completed 21 counterintelligence inspections and surveys, 56 technical inspections, and 19 counterintelligence evaluations.

(C) The Group continued to provide CI support, in the form of advisors to MSS security elements, to the combined US-ARVN Operation FAIRFAX. Basic concept of this operation is to search and clear the three districts of Gia Dinh Province adjacent to the Siigon area of Viet Cong guerilla, main force, and infrastructure personnel. The plan to clear a hamlet begins with selection of targets and allocation of suitably-equipped units to accomplish the mission by the US and RVN infantry commanders and the District Chief. The tactical elements seal off the selected hamlet during the hours of darkness, and at dawn the MSS teams move into the hamlet with blacklists prepared by MACV and augmented with information gathered during the actual conduct of operations. House to house searches and terrain sweeps are executed to gather up suspects, who are dispatched to the interrogation points for further questioning.

(C) Organization of the Group has not changed significantly. At the beginning of the reporting period, there were a total of 358 personnel assigned and at the end of the period, there were a total of 407 personnel assigned. Net increase of personnel for the period was 49.

	Off	WO	EM	TOTAL
Beg Pd	80	38	240	358
End Pd	79	41	287	407
Net Chg	-1	+3	+47	+49

Of the total personnel assigned, 43 are on temporary duty to provide operational support to field elements.

	Off	WO	EM	TOTAL
	(13)	(4)	(26)	(43)

(U) On 7 June 1967, the OACSI Inspector General conducted an inspection of Intelligence Contingency Fund and ICF Property. The formal inspection report received from OACSI indicated no discrepancies in ICF accounting procedures.

(U) From 19 to 23 June 1967, the USARV Inspector General conducted an inspection of the 135th Military Intelligence Group Headquarters and field elements. It was the consensus of all members of the inspection team that the mission of the group was being accomplished in a commendable manner.

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(U) A training program implementing USARV Regulation 350-1, Subject: Education and Training, has been maintained at this headquarters. Attendance records indicate an attendance rate of close to 100 percent. Some difficulty has been encountered in completing training requirements for the field elements, due to their scattered disposition, size, and operational priorities. During the reporting period, the Group engaged in training activities for a total of 13 days.

SECTION II
Part I
Observations - Lesson Learned

Operations

Item (C): Indigenous Absenteeism Early Warning System

Discussion (C): Experience has shown that Viet Cong (VC) have security leaks, and relatives of VC have good knowledge of pending attacks on US installations.

Observation (C): Care must be exercised to subject indigenous absenteeism to close scrutiny, since an extremely large number of unwarranted indigenous employee absenteeism could possibly indicate a planned attack on a US installation by VC Forces.

Item (U): Possible Overuse of RTT Facilities

Discussion (U): RTT Facilities handle many messages which could be transmitted via faster means.

Observation (U): Messages routed through RTT nets should be confined to those messages, which, because of the content or priority, cannot be transmitted via telephone or daily courier. Outgoing messages should be analyzed by length and for content, and routed through the most convenient facility, enabling messages with greater importance to be delivered via fastest possible means.

Item (U): Requests for name checks are being submitted on Lead Sheets by higher headquarters, and from other intelligence units; however, in most cases, identifying data accompanying each name is not sufficient.

Discussion (U): Numerous man-hours are expended needlessly when lists of names to be checked with MSS must be returned for lack of proper identifying information. In the past, higher headquarters and sister

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agencies have requested MSS file checks on names with little or no further identification than name and approximate location or occupation. MSS has advised that diacritical markings, date and place of birth, current complete address and occupation of subject, and subject's parents name should be included if possible. As an absolute minimum, to provide enough information for a name file check, age and residence of subject and his parent's names are requested. To verify the security clearance of an individual, the MSS security clearance number for that individual must be provided, since security clearances are filed by that number only.

Observation (U): Any office or agency submitting a name to be checked against MSS files should include at least the minimum identifying data, indicated above, for each name.

Item (C): Coding of Sources

Discussion (C): The MSS, 7th Division Tactical Area (DTA) has initiated a complete screening and evaluation of their sources. They have designated all informants as either sympathy or coded sources.

Observation (C): Upon completion of the program, MSS 7th DTA will be able to indicate a source number on all information reports, and thus, evaluate and maintain a credibility chart on each informant.

Item (C): CI Operations

Discussion (C): MSS 7th DTA has numbered and categorized their CI operations. Operations are of two types; tactical and long range. Each operation is given a number and letter indicating its category.

Observation (C): The numbering of CI operations is useful in the monitoring of operations and the conduct of operational briefings.

Item (C): VC Tactics

Discussion (C): The VC frequently deploy 25-30 men to investigate an area of ARVN operations within 24 hours of the termination of an operation. The VC are lightly armed during such post-operation reconnaissance.

Observation (C): Battle sites should be well policed upon termination of an operation. This VC tactic gives ARVN an opportunity to employ ambushes to good advantage.

Item (C): MSS Security Clearances

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Discussion (C): In most MSS offices, a very small section must initiate all paperwork for security clearances of indigenous employees utilized by Americans. A considerable time delay thus occurs in the granting of clearances. When a large number of indigenous employees must be cleared in a short period of time, it is helpful for the US agencies concerned to complete as much of the paperwork and fingerprinting as possible before submission to MSS.

Observation (C): The time factor in the granting of clearances by MSS can be decreased considerably if the US agencies will complete as much of the paperwork as possible before submission to MSS.

Item (C): Field Trip with MSS Counterparts

Discussion (C): Excellent results have been gained from joint field trips by the Chief, Special Operations Branch, Region IV, 135th MI Group, and the Chief, Special Operations, MSS IV CTZ. Such trips are usually made to one office in order to discuss a specific item concerning Special Operations. Numerous points have been clarified and the dissemination of information has been facilitated. The rapport established between counterparts has greatly improved the overall working relationship for bilateral operations.

Observation (C): Bilateral operations can be greatly enhanced by field trips conducted jointly between the US and Vietnamese counterparts.

Item (C): Exchange of information among Vietnamese intelligence agencies and dissemination from the combined intelligence centers down to Vietnamese intelligence centers and to Vietnamese intelligence agencies is generally poor.

Discussion (C): Operational Military Security Service units frequently do not get Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) or the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) reports and sometimes do not obtain or read National Police and Saigon Municipal Police reports. Such information is necessary for a firm grasp of the enemy intelligence situation in each province and for operational planning that will avoid duplication of effort. The Operational Assistance Team (OAT), MSS/Capital Special Zone (CSZ), has established a program under which several hundred CDEC, CMIC, and other reports are screened weekly for passage to MSS/CSZ. Reports containing exploitable or otherwise usable information concerning Gia Dinh Province are ordered from CDEC or CMIC in original Vietnamese or are translated by OAT translators and passed to MSS/CSZ. MSS/CSZ receives this information from no other source and is happy to get it. To date no operation or arrests have resulted

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from passed information, but several leads, especially under Operation Longbeach, have been followed. Information is used also for revision and expansion of blacklists. As a minimum, this program serves as an effective training vehicle, showing the counterparts in a vigorous practical manner one aspect of the work of other agencies and of the need for coordination. Follow-up questions relating to reports passed provides an excellent lever for spurring counterparts to necessary action.

Observation (C): Intelligence personnel in each province in the Republic of Vietnam should be furnished with CDEC, CMIC, and other intelligence reports concerned with their province for their information and for passage and follow-up to their MSS counterparts. Sanitized versions of the many US Intelligence reports classified No Foreign Dissemination should be prepared for passage. Such a program would have to be accomplished through a screening, rewriting, and distribution office in an intelligence agency, but it would be a relatively inexpensive and easy way to spur MSS activity, to provide information for exchange rather than asking for information, and to set a high example of intelligence professionalism.

Item (C): Withholding of true motivation for employment with United States Intelligence (USI) during initial contact by prospective sources.

Discussion (C): It has become apparent that sources in Vietnam frequently do not divulge, during initial contacts, their real reason for wishing to be employed by USI. Usually their motivation is stated to be something they feel would be acceptable to the American Case Officer, i.e., anti-communist spirit, patriotism, or desire to work with the Americans. Eventually, these varied reasons demonstrate their false foundation by their lack of force in motivation of their source. Through patient evaluation of the source and assessment of professed motivation, these false motivations become apparent. Frequently the true motivation is one which the source does not feel would be acceptable to the Case Officer or one which would cause the source's reputation to suffer or lose face. The motivations a source may be reluctant to divulge can be monetary gains, revenge, gathering information for blackmail, distorted patriotism, or political.

Observation (C): When the true motivation of a source is not known, the source's actions may lead to a false evaluation of the source. An American Case Officer must constantly search for the true motivation in order that it may be manipulated to better the performance of the source.

Item (C): Liaison with and Training of the MSS

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Discussion (C): The relationship of the 135th MI Group to the MSS is in an advisory capacity; and, accordingly, the need for tact, professionalism, and patience is great. In general, MSS personnel appear to be reluctant to learn out of a training manual. They will accept and learn from practical application, however. If the individual MSS member can see tangible results, he will be amenable to the methods demonstrated. Of specific note is the fact that the area of basic professional competence in which MSS personnel appear the weakest is that of interrogation.

Observation (C): To correct the situation in the area of MSS interrogation procedures, US counterparts should assist in improvement of interrogations of all levels. This can best be accomplished by the use of practical application technique. After MSS has completed an interrogation of a given subject, US personnel should conduct a second interrogation covering the points missed by MSS. Combining the results of both interrogations then presents tangible evidence of what a properly conducted interrogation can produce. US personnel must use utmost tact to avoid offending the professional sensitivities of the MSS.

Item (C): Increase in use of Technical Equipment by MSS

Discussion (C): Evidence of an increase in the use of monitoring and photographic equipment indicates the expansion of interest in the MSS concerning the field of technical aids.

Observation (C): Besides the need for American training and advisory aid in the field of technical equipment, it also indicates an increase of the degree of professionalism on the part of the MSS.

Other basic procedures in Counterpart Relations are:

- a. Do not make decisions for the MSS counterpart; rather, concerning matters of mutual interest, be capable of indicating to counterpart the choices that may be available. If one has an opinion, it should be tactfully stated and identified as such.
- b. Do not work through a senior counterpart's subordinates as a substitute for good relations with counterpart himself. If relations are not good, it is a mistake to utilize counterpart's subordinates to gain information. This will result in resentment and suspicions concerning the US assistance effort and the counterpart could carry his resentment for years. The resentment could also be transferred to counterpart's associates causing further harm to the effort.

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c. Do take an interest in counterpart's family, and if it is apparent that you are welcome, take advantage of opportunities to visit him in his home. Good taste, however, dictates that you do not force yourself upon him socially. In this connection, it is well to familiarize yourself with Vietnamese customs and practice this when visiting.

d. Do not make an ostentatious display of wealth, either through ICF or personnel funds. Bear in mind that the VN military pay scale is well below that of the US agent and MSS operational funds are limited. Gifts, when presented, should not be lavish.

e. Do not be obsequious or patronizing in the relationship with the MSS counterpart, or overly firm. There are pitfalls in both directions, and the proper balance between the two is a necessity to success.

f. Do remember that although the US agent has received training in the fine points of intelligence modus operandi to which the MSS member may not have been exposed, the counterpart is indigenous to this country. He, therefore, possesses a wealth of useful knowledge and experience to include in some cases up to twenty-odd years of active counterinsurgency operations.

g. Do remember that although the counterpart is a representative of an allied nation, his basic loyalty does not rest with the United States. Friendship and harmonious working relationships are desirable; however, the principles of security should never be neglected.

LOGISTICS

Item (U): Use of Conventional 6 passenger type sedans in RVN

Discussion (U): The use of conventional size US sedans as military vehicles in RVN is impractical for several reasons. The small number of metropolitan areas with serviceable road systems in RVN are relatively isolated. The current lack of safe serviceable connecting highways between these metropolitan areas restricts travel by sedan to the confines of these isolated metropolitan areas. Of the paved roads currently existent in RVN, most are of the two lane variety barely wide enough to accommodate large sedans. The roads are usually in various stages of disrepair with frequent potholes not uncommon. Traffic congestion in urban areas of RVN is uniquely troublesome for the Western driver. The profusion of bicycles and scooters together with the frequent appearance of long military convoys results in large scale traffic jams. Under such conditions there is a need for vehicle

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maneuverability of which the comparatively unwieldy sedan is incapable. The conventional US sedan also constitutes a security hazard not only because of the sedan's size but also because of the sedan's common association with VIP passengers. In a hostile environment, the sedan and its occupants become easy targets for terrorist activity. The comparatively confined interior of a sedan restricts fields of vision and make the sedan difficult to evacuate quickly. Windows must be kept closed to prevent grenades from being tossed into the sedan. Without air conditioning, this causes acute discomfort in the tropical climate of RVN. Difficulties in requisitioning and stocking non interchangeable repair parts for commercial vehicles causes many sedans to be deadlined for extended periods. The lack of personnel trained to service non-military vehicles constitutes another drawback. Both of these problems are aggravated when one organization uses a variety of makes and models of sedans.

Observation (U): Whenever possible, military vehicles such as the M151A $\frac{1}{2}$ ton truck should be substituted for commercial sedans. In situations where the use of $\frac{1}{2}$ ton is impractical, the use of smaller foreign cars or American "compact" cars is advisable.

Item (U): Fluorescent light tube contact points

Discussion (U): The high humidity and other corrosive effects of the climate in Vietnam will cause contact points on fluorescent light tubes to corrode to the extent that they will not conduct electricity. This will occur even while the tubes are in the lamp in contact with the copper contacts. In one office four of six tubes were found to be corroded to the extent that they would not light, and it has been assumed that they were burned out.

Observation (U): Do not discard fluorescent tubes without first cleaning the contact points with an abrasive such as sandpaper, steel wool, or emery cloth, or scraping with a sharp instrument such as a knife blade. Then reinsert the tube in the lamp to determine if it is in fact burned out before discarding. Chances are it may light again, once the contacts have been cleaned of the insulating corrosion.

Item (U): Possible Inadequacy of 3 Ton Hydraulic Lift, FSN 5102-233-6829

Discussion (U): Utilization of the 3 Ton Hydraulic Lift with vehicles larger than $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton truck can be dangerous, i.e., tipping, sliding, and slipping.

Observation (U): The 3 Ton Hydraulic Lift 5102-233-6829 should be manufactured in the future with a considerably larger base and top,

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enabling the user to utilize this equipment in a safer manner. Lifts on hand and in supply channels should be fitted, with a detachable-attachable base and top, which would serve the same purpose as proposed changes.

Item (U): Damaging of Office Floors by Movement of Security Containers

Discussion (U): The movement of large security containers causes gouging and marring of floors.

Observation (U): Large security containers, such as SF-C4, FSN 7110-286-3799, cause damage to floors in Army commands world wide. Dollar-cost to the government is inestimable. Container construction should be reviewed for possible modifications which would ease movement.

Item (U): Excessive Weight of Photo Unit PH406 w/EN 16(1) Enlarger

Discussion (U): Photo Processing Unit PH406 w/EN 16(1) Enlarger has been manufactured in such a manner that its size and weight is not conducive to proper unit maintenance, operational functioning, and emergency evacuation/destruction procedures. A majority of the equipment is made from cast metal which makes unit repair virtually impossible.

Observation (U): Care must be exercised when dismantling and reassembling the EN 16(1) Enlarger. Should breakage result, parts must be spot-welded, and cracks sealed with plastic sealing compound. To complete initial unit assembly, a great number of cast metal parts may need minor filing. Excessive weight causes undue strain on support members and joints.

Item (U): Excessive Damage to Directional Signal Lightbulbs of M151, M151A1 1/2 Ton Truck

Discussion (U): Unpaved and rough roads tend to exaggerate the internal damage of glass envelope and filament of lightbulbs, because of improper seating during assembly.

Observation (U): All 1/2 Ton trucks should receive additional attention to insure proper seating of rubber shock insulator. In some cases, shock insulators have become subject to "dry rot" and should be replaced.

Item (U): Compatibility of Photographical Supplies

Discussion (U): Technical Support Branch has been supplied with Kodak chemicals, and film from Ansco, General Aniline, and DuPont Corporations.

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(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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Observation (U): Incompatability among the supplied film and chemicals causes processing time of the film to increase and decreases the standards of the finished photographs.

Item (C): Defective Field Telephones

Discussion (C): It has been noted that the spring clip, which supplies pressure to keep disc connector in the disconnected position when not in use, is very unsatisfactory.

Observation (C): Equip the field telephone with a reasonably fool proof disc connect devise. Such a disc connect device would virtually eliminate the serious security threat which is present. When the disc connect is not held in place, all audio sounds within 20 feet of telephone microphone are continuously transmitted over the service telephone lines.

SECTION II
Part 2
Recommendations

1. (U) That messages routed through RTT nets be confined to priority classified messages. Maximum use should be made of telephone, and daily courier.
2. (C) That any office of agency submitting a name to be checked against MSS files include diacritical markings, date and place of birth, complete current address, occupation of subject, and subject's parents name.
3. (C) That battle sites should be well policed upon termination of an operation.
4. (U) That US agencies complete as much of the paperwork and fingerprinting as possible prior to submission of local national security clearance requests.
5. (U) That vehicles smaller than commercial sedans be substituted for sedans wherever possible.
6. (U) That the 3 ton hydraulic lift, 5102-233-6828 be fitted with a larger base and top.
7. (U) That construction of large security containers, such as SF-C4 or FSN 7110-286-3799, be reviewed for possible modifications

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RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

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enabling ease of movement.

8 (U) That field telephones be equipped with a more effective
spring clip - disc connector assembly.

C. A. Cole

C. A. COLE
COL, MI
Commanding

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AVGJ-HOADM (12 Aug 67) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
(RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, 525th Military Intelligence Group, APO 96307, 14 September 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, AVC-DH, APO 96375

This headquarters concurs with the recommendations of the 135th Military Intelligence Group.

FOR THE COMMANDER

for W. T. Marney CPT
WAYNE S. LETHGO
Major, AGC
Adjutant

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AVNGC-DT (12 Aug 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (AMC COMFOR-65) (u)

ALL DOCUMENTS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-01,
APO 96558

1. (u) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 159th Military Intelligence Group (AMC) as indicated.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning name checks, paragraph 2, part 2, section II. Concur. The following action has been taken to insure proper COMUS name trace requests with Vietnamese agencies to include file checks: A letter was forwarded by headquarters, COMUS to the US Army Intelligence Command outlining the standard method of writing Vietnamese names e.g. family name, middle name (s) and finally the given name. It was requested that this information be given com and wide dissemination. This letter also requested that the Vietnamese International Telegraphic Code be used in parenthesis following the name in electrically transmitted name trace requests due to the omission in transmission of the diacritical markings present in many Vietnamese names.

b. Reference paragraph 4, part 2, section III, concerning the submission of Local National Security Clearance requests. Concur. Incomplete or incorrect requests for local national security clearances can result in unnecessary delays in receiving the requested clearances.

c. Reference item concerning messages, paragraph 1, page 14; this is a matter for resolution within the 159th MI Group. The staff message control activity where messages originate is the proper place to determine which method of transmission is to be utilized. A command education program on message precedences and handling should be initiated and appropriate command emphasis should be applied.

3. (u) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine endorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

William T. Stark

14 **J. L. KENNEDY**
Cpt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT(12 Aug 67)

3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ 135th MI Gp (UIC:WPN7AA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
endorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



MEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AAC
Asst AG

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

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Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 135th Military Intelligence Group

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 July 1967

5. AUTHORITY (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO, 135th Military Intelligence Group

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d.		
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT		
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D. C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

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